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1. Introduction
Empirical evidences demonstrate that different size enterprises pay different wages 
(Esteves, 2008, Ahn, 2006; Fox, 2004; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999; Romanguera, 
1991; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Haber and Lamas, 1988; Barth et al, 1987). Most of them 
provide two sources of explanations. From one side, wage differentials by firm size arise 
because of firm’s and worker’s heterogeneity, and from the other side, companies with high 
monitoring costs pay higher salaries than the market clearing  level  (the efficiency  wage 
theory).
Different sizes enterprises behave differently because they differ on the organization 
of production and consequently hire workers accordingly to their productive needs. This, in 
turn, has a direct impact on the labor remuneration. Oi (1983) argues that it is the level of 
entrepreneurial ability that gives origin to firms with different sizes, where the ones with 
greater managerial skills will be able to develop large size firms because they can coordinate a 
higher volume of standardized goods and employ a large amount of workers. 
On the other hand, big companies will  face high monitoring costs since they have 
more employees to supervise and also because the opportunity cost of monitoring is greater 
for more skilled entrepreneurs. As a consequence, firms with different sizes will bare different 
monitoring costs which, in turn, affect their demand of labor. The result of this dynamics is 
that  large  firms  in  order  to  minimize  surveillance  costs  have  incentives  to  hire  more 
productive  workers  and  to  design  a  more  capital  intensive  production,  while  the  small 
companies tend to be more labor intensive and to admit less skilled individuals (Barth et al 
1987apud Haber and Lamas, 1988).
On the same line of reasoning, Fox (2004) shows evidences of a positive correlation 
between firm size and wages for the private sector in the United States and Sweden. He 
argues that workers attributes, such as talent or non-wage preferences for the firm, affect the 
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firm’s  decision of  wages.  Some  workers  judge  that  large  enterprises have  a poor work 
environment because it has more rules, requests more intensive work or is more impersonal, 
thus, on the margin the employees have lower preferences for the big firms and the large 
employers need to pay a compensating wage to attract labor (Fox, 2004; Oi, 1983).
From the arguments above, we see that the wage differentials are caused either by 
worker’s  ability  and  non-wage  preferences,  which  are  unobservable  variables,  or  by 
differences  in  enterprises  monitoring  costs.  Under  competitive  assumptions,  marginal 
productivity of labor equals salaries and full-employment condition must hold, therefore no 
wage differentials should persist for similar workers. As a result, there are only two reasons 
consistent with competitive models for the wage gap existence: the need to compensate for 
non-pecuniary  workers  preferences and  individual’s  ability.  Note  that  both  of  them  are 
unobservable  variables,  which  implies  that  the  main  reason  for  such  differential  in 
competitive models would be due to measurement problems (Romanguera, 1991). 
The efficiency wage (EW) models also demonstrate how wage distribution (for similar 
workers) can arise in equilibrium, however, for quite different mechanisms than the ones 
predicted by the competitive models. The EW theory incorporates the idea that enterprises 
would get better economic results if they remunerate their employees with a higher wage than 
the market clearing level and there are various reasons why the firms would behave in such a 
way. The shirking version proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) demonstrates that firms 
that face high monitoring costs find shirking so costly that the payment of high wages is a 
proper incentive to extract labor effort. There are large empirical evidences that support the 
existence of efficiency wage (Krueger and Summers, 1987 and 1988; Dickens and Katz 1987a 
and 1987b,  and  Groshen,  1986). However,  in  less  developed  countries  (LDCs)  the 
investigation of wage differentials due to efficiency wages has not been widely explored, 
most of these studies focus on competitive models, as discussed before. 
In this paper we are particularly interested in verifying if the prediction of the EW 
theory, on its shirking version, can explain the wage growth in development countries. The 
idea that monitoring costs differs by firm size suggests that the amount of effort a worker 
whishes to devote to his/her job tasks, might vary as well. Motivated by this issue, we seek to 
test  the  following  hypothesis:  large  size  firms  pay  higher  wages  because  they  tend  to 
remunerate better the effort in order to minimize monitoring costs, which are greater when 
compared to smaller enterprises. We adopt a Switching Regression Model (Maddala, 1983) to 
estimate the increase of wage for small and large enterprises, between the years of 2006 and 
2007.3
The rest of the paper is organized as followed. The next section introduces a literature 
review about the EW models emphasizing on the developments of the shirking version. The 
following  one  presents  the  data  used  for  the  estimations  and  briefly  describes  some 
characteristics  of the Brazilian  Labor Monthly  Survey  (PME/  IBGE).  The fourth section 
brings the estimation strategies based on the Switching Model described in Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005). The results obtained are presented in the fifth and the last section concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review on Efficiency Wage Models
There are various versions of the EW models that explain why it is profitable for an 
employer to fix the wage above the market clearing level and each of them exploit different 
mechanisms on the relation among worker, employer and the market forces. Romanguera 
(1991)  lists seven distinct approaches for the EW models, which will be briefly described 
below: 
 Nutritional  Model: the earliest of these  models.  It was developed by Leibenstein 
(1957) and established that the positive correlation between effort and wage would be 
motivated by  the  worker’s  health and nutrition that could  be  achieved by highest 
consumption supported by higher salaries. 
 Adverse Selection Model: predicts that better workers have better alternative offers 
and that the high wage firms have greater probability of attracting a better pool of 
applicants (Weiss, 1980, apud Romanguera, 1991). 
 Recruiting Model: emphasizes that firms find costly to have a job offer turned down 
because of recruitment costs and forgone production, therefore the entrepreneur has an
incentive  to  catch  the  applicant  by  offering  an elevated  salary  (Lang,  1988  and 
Montgomery, 1988, apud Romanguera, 1991). 
 Sociological or Normative Model: relies on the idea that agents are not completely 
individualistic in their choices, but also value social conventions that are not totally
individualistic. As a consequence, the worker perceives his or her higher remuneration 
as  a  “gift” to be rewarded  (Solow,  1979  and  1980; Akerlof,  1982 and  1984;  and 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, apud Romanguera, 1991). 4
 Union Threat Model: argues that collective action enables workers with bargaining 
power that allows them to appropriate part of the firm’s rents, which in turn leads to 
higher wages (Dickens, 1986 apud Romanguera, 1991).
 Turnover Model: it is very similar to the shirking version that will be presented next. 
This model assumes that labor turnover is costly for the firm because they lose the 
investments made on the job training and because workers have lower productivity in 
the  adjustment  process.  As a result,  firms  in  order  to  minimize  such costs have 
incentive to  prevent turnover by paying higher salaries  (Salop,  1979  and Stiglitz, 
1974, 1986 apud Romanguera, 1991).
 The shirking version: it was proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and bases its 
structure on the following intuition: if unemployment represents a penalty for those 
who were caught shirking, then workers will choose not do so. The employers, on 
their side, in order to avoid shirking have  incentive to pay  more  than the “going 
wage”, thus if all firms act similarly the labor demand will reduce and, therefore, 
unemployment arises. Note that the employers cannot monitor the activities of their 
employees costlessly and perfectly and that is why high wage represents savings for 
the firm both in monitoring costs and in the increased output due to higher effort. 
Therefore, there is an informational problem between employers and workers in the 
structure of this model that explains how involuntary unemployment can persist as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. 
The Basic Model of the Shirking Version (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984)
The model starts assuming that there are a fixed number of N identical workers who 
dislikes  exerting  labor effort and enjoy consumption,  with utility  represented by  U(w,e), 
where w is the wage earned and e is the level of effort put on the job activities. When an 
individual is unemployed, he or she receives a benefit of w
b and e=0. There is a probability b, 
taken  as  exogenous, that a worker  can be dismissed  from  the  job due to relocation,  for 
example, but not because he or she was caught shirking. However, if the employee shirks, 
there is some probability q that he or she will be caught and fired. The worker utility is 
max imized at a discount rate of r>0
3. 
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The only choice the worker makes is the selection of the effort level, by comparing the 
utility  of  shirking  (
S
E V )  and  not  shirking  (
N
E V ).  The  utility  equations  of  a  shirker  and 
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where Vu is the utility of being unemployed that will be presented latter. Working with both 
equations yields the following solutions:
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condition (NSC):
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Note that the critical wage 
^
w is positively related with the effort level (e), the utility 
of being unemployed ( u V ), the interest rate (r) and with the quit rate (b), but it is inversely 
related with the probability of being caught (q). 
From the employers side, there are M identical firms with a production function Qi = 
f(Li) generating an aggregate production of Q = F(L). An enterprise pays w for its employees 
and must pay some level w
b of unemployment benefits, which will be set at the minimum 
level as possible. Thus, the firm’s labor demand  ) (
'
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In  the simplest version of this m odel,  the  monitoring  technology  (q)  is taken as 
exogenous. When the firms endogenize q, they can trade off monitoring by higher wages as a 
method of labor discipline and firms who have high costs of monitoring will choose to pay 
higher  salaries.  It  implies  that  firms  are  no  longer  identical  since  they  differ  on  their 
monitoring technologies and, therefore, might choose different levels of wages for workers 
alike. 6
The market equilibrium is determined when each firm, taking as given the wages and 
employment levels, finds it optimal to offer the going wage rather than a different wage
4. In 
order  to  find  the  no-shirking  condition  after  incorporating the  firm’s  behavior,  lets  first 
present the utility of a worker being unemployed:
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where a is the job acquisition rate and  E V is utility of an employed worker, which equals to 
N
E V , in equilibrium. Solving for (4)and (6), we have:
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Replacing (8) into the NSC (5)yields the aggregate NSC:
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Observe  that  the  critical  wage  is g reater,  the  highest  w
b and  the  flows  out  of 
unemployment a. Since a is the probability of obtaining a job per unit of time, 1/a is the 
expected  duration  of  unemployment,  so  the  longer  this  duration,  the  smaller  the  wage 
necessary to induce nonshirking. In steady-state the flow into unemployment, bL, equals the 
flow out, a(N-L), which gives:
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Substituting for a into (9), the aggregate NSC becomes:
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where u = (N-L)/N, is the unemployment rate. Market equilibrium occurs where the aggregate 
NSC intersects the aggregate demand for labor. 
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Equation (11)shows the mechanisms that induce companies to pay high salaries. From 
the worker’s point of view, he or she wishes to keep a high remuneration because entering 
into unemployment represents a penalty given the lost of the high wages themselves and 
because  with  high salaries the  labor  demand  will  be low,  which  implies  long spells  of 
unemployment. As result to keep that level of labor income, workers will choose to devote the 
highest amount of effort necessary to reach the critical wage at NSC. From the firm’s side, 
when they have control on their monitoring technologies, two outcomes are possible, firms 
that face high monitoring costs will have incentive to pay 
^
w as a worker discipline, and also 
because they want to keep a high level of output due to increased effort. But if the monitoring 
costs aren’t high enough, the firms do not need to pay an elevated salary because they can 
easily observe workers effort and this is a sufficient mechanism for no-shirking. 
As argued on the first section of this article, large size firms employ a larger number 
of workers and face relatively greater monitoring costs, since they hire more skilled managers 
whose  opportunity  cost  of monitoring  is more  expensive. Small  firms,  by contrast,  can 
manage to monitor workers activities in a cheaper way. As a result of this process, we expect 
the find the following outcome: large companies pay a higher wage premium for dispended 
labor effort,as compared to smaller enterprises. 
3. The Data Description
The paper uses data from the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) for the 
years of 2006 and 2007. It is a longitudinal survey that is based on a rotating panel, where a 
group of households is selected in every sample sector and each of these households are 
interviewed for four consecutive months, after that they exit the survey to come back again 
eight  months  later  and  be  followed  for  four  additional  months.  The  survey  covers  six 
metropolitan regions of Brazil: Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro 
and Porto Alegre.
The target variable to be studied here is the wage growth between 2006 and 2007 for 
workers employed in small and large size firms. There are two group of explaining variables 
included  in the model, one capturing  the  usual worker’s socioeconomic  features, such as 
gender, age, head of family and education, and the other covering the characteristics of the 
job, such as sector of activity, type of contract (if temporary or not), legal contribution for 
social security, time working for the firm, and two proxies variables designed to capture the 8
effort level of the worker: sub-occupation and sub-remuneration. The individuals considered 
sub-occupied were those who worked less than 40 hours a week, but wished to work more, 
while sub-remuneration addressed to those employees who received a wage that was inferior 
to the average salary the category of similar workers used to earn. This last proxy corresponds 
to unpaid overtime work because when the employee is sub-remunerated he or she is receives 
less per hour worked, being equivalent to working unpaid hours. 
The choice of these proxies followed the spirit of the studies of Bradley et al (2007), 
Engellandt and Riphahn (2003), Booth et al (2000) and Jimeno and Cortes (1996), whose 
works chose as effort level proxies, unpaid overtime work or absenteeism. This last variable, 
however, is not trustable to be used in the present paper because the PME is answered by the 
employee and he or she would rather not reveal job absenteeism, a problem that doesn’t exist 
when the employer, instead, is interviewed. 
The selection of our database used workers employed in small firms to medium, with 
less than 10 employees, and those employed in large firms, with eleven or more workers. 
After the  removal of  missing observations,  we  ended up  with  37,024  observations,  being 
6,196 workers in the smallto mediumfirms and 30,828 in the large ones.
The data used for the estimations is presented in Table 1, which brings individual 
attributes of the worker and the job characteristics according to the firm size.9
Table 1
Sample characteristic according to the firm size
CHARACTERISTICS
FIRM SIZE
SMALL AND MEDIUM LARGE
Individuals
Man 59.64% 62.47%
16 to 25 years old 30.94% 23.29%
26 to 40 years old 40.90% 44.84%
41 to 70 years old 28.16% 31.87%
Head of family 43.35% 48.93%
Years of school 3.07 3.40
From the job
Average wage R$ 602.66 R$1,593.62
Temporary contract 3.94% 4.65%
Social security contribution 52.94% 84.64%
Working for 1 month 1.63% 0.80%
1 month to 1 year of work 22.11% 17.25%
1 to 2 years of work 15.74% 13.88%







Public administration 7.26% 15.44%
N° of observations 6,196 30,828
Source: Labor Monthly Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME/IBGE, 2006 and 2007).
Table 1 tells us that there exists some worker’s heterogeneity from individual and, 
especially, from the job aspects. Large size firms employ in average a higher percentage of 
man, head of family and hire employees slightly more educated. The greatest difference arise 
in terms of wage paid: the average salary of large firms is almost three times as greater as the 
one paid in small and medium enterprises. 
Another striking discrepancy is the social security contribution and sub-remuneration. 
The highest percentage of workers under sub-remuneration explains why the average wage of 
small to medium firms is so much lower than the one paid in larger ones. The social security 
contribution, on its turn, is also expected to be inferior in small and medium companies, since 
this segment of the Brazilian labor market concentrates the highest amount of the so-called 
“informal” business that do not pay taxes and usual labor legal costs. 
Other differences important to mention, but not as remarkable as the ones just cited, 
refers to the fact that small and medium firms employ in average more temporary workers 
who work for the firm for a inferior period of time when compared to the labor duration in 10
bigger enterprises, while the percentage of sub-occupied workers is higher in smaller firms. 
The  distribution  among  economic  sector  is also heterogeneous  by  firm  size:  large  firms 
concentrate labor demand on the industry segment, while small to medium companies employ 
more on the sales sector
4. Empirical Strategy
In  this section  we  present  the  empirical  strategy  used  to  investigate  the  inter-
dependence  of  wage  increase  and  firm  size  given  worker’s  and  firm’s  attributes.  The 
hypothesis to be tested is that large firms remunerate better the worker effort. In order to test 
it, the paper follows the empirical strategy proposed by Jappelli et al (1997) and Gross and 
Souleles  (2001),  whose  developments  is b ased  on  Roy’s  model  also  denominated  as 
Switching Model by Maddala (1983). 
According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the origin of the Roy’s model departure 
from a Roy’s article (1951), which considered that the existence of individual heterogeneous 
skills  and  self-selection  into  job  occupations  could  create  occupational  differentials  of 
earnings. The application of such model is very suitable for the problem studied in the present 
paper, since it might be the case that the wage differentials by firm size could arise as a 
consequence of heterogeneous skills and levels of effort. The model adopted here comes from 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and is described as follows. 
There is a latent variable 
*
1 c indicating if the observed result is 
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2 c or 
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1  c if the individual works for small firm and  0
*
1  c if he or she works for medium 
or large companies. Based in (12) it can be defined a linear system with additive errors for the 
latent variable:
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The first equation indicates if the person works or not in a small firm. The second and third 
equations have  as  dependent variable the  wage growth,  between  2006  and  2007,  for  the 
individuals  who  work  and do not  work  in small  firms.  The  matrix  it X is composed of 
exogenous variables  that  represent  the  preferences  and characteristics  of  individuals  and 
market. The  it Y vector consists of apparently endogenous variables, such as years of school, 
while  it Z is a vector of instruments.  The  idea  behind  the system  present  in  (13) is that 
         it it it it y x y x 2 2 2
'
2 3 3 3
'
3 , where α is the extra-wage paid by larger enterprises for 
workers  alike.  Assuming  that  the  correlated  errors  have  a joint  normal  distribution,  the 
































































As usual (14) is normalized  for  1
2
1   ,  only when 
*
1 c is observed.  The  most  common 
estimation strategy is the Heckman’s two-step method applied to the truncated means:
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where  ) ( ) ( ) ( Z Z Z    is the inverse-Mills ratio. At the first stage, it is estimated a probit 
model, which binary dependent variable (
*
1 c ) is whether the individual works or not in a 
small/ medium enterprise. This first-stage estimation is, thus, the selection equation and yields 
estimates of  1  and  ) ( 1
'
1   it x . At the second stage, two separated OLS regressions give the 
estimates for  ) , ( 12 2   and  ) , ( 13 3   . 
5. The Results for the Wage Growth  Es timation in Brazil using Switching Regression 
Model
In this section, the key hypothesis of this paper is tested. The switching endogenous 
regression model is used to investigate if the predictions of the efficiency wage theory holds 
for a development country, such as Brazil. The idea is to test if large firms because of higher 
monitoring costs do pay a higher wage in order to extract more labor effort. 12
As discussed in the first section, individuals might have non-wage preferences for the 
firm and heterogeneous abilities, which make the decision of working or not in a small firm 
conditioned to some endogeneity problem. The assumption is that this choice is associated to 
some demographic and occupational  characteristics, such  as  the variable presented  in the 
selection equation in Table 2. Some of these variables are used as instruments (vector  it Z : 
education, being head of family and having temporary contract) and the estimates of all of 
them were significant and presented the expected sign, as discussed next.
The results in Table 2 indicate that the probability of working in a small to medium 
size enterprise decreases with age, years of school, growth of schooling and within workers 
who are head of family. These results are consistent with empirical evidences provided by 
Fox (2004), in which he argues that it is efficient to match high-ability workers together with 
large  employers because  the  marginal  product  of  a manager supervising  a large  firm is
greater.  Additionally, older workers or heads of family represent individuals carrying more 
familiar responsibilities, so they tend to be more experienced, value more the employment 
and, as consequence, are rather desired by more structured and larger firms.
On the other hand, the chances of working  on a small to  medium  size  enterprise 
increase within workers under temporary contract and who contributes for social security. For 
the first case, Booth et al (2000) find evidences that temporary employees present greater 
probability of wishing to separate (either to change occupation or geographical location) or a 
higher cost (or lower benefit) to acquiring specific human capital. Considering that large size 
firms tend to invest more on firm-specific training in order to produce large standardized 
volumes  of output,  labor  turnover  can  represent substantial cost  for the  large employer, 
therefore, they do not wish a worker who presents high probability of quitting. As for the 
positive relation between the chances of working in a small to medium company and social 
security contribution, we have an unexpected result, which is possibly associated with the 
recent  “formalization”  process  in the Brazilian  labor  market  that  might  be  increasing the 
chances of a worker who benefits fromsocial security tobe employed in a small firm. In fact 
between 2006 and 2007, the proportion of employees who contributed to social security in 
small firms increased 10%, while the growth observed in large firms was only of 3% (PME/ 
IBGE, 2006 and 2007).
The  geographic dummies  indicate that  the  probability of  working  in  a small  firm 
decreases  in  the  metropolitan  regions  of  Belo  Horizonte,  São Paulo  and  Porto  Alegre 
relatively to the reference dummy of Salvador. This is an expected result since these three 13
cities are located in the most developed regions of Brazil, which concentrate larger and more 
structured companies, while Salvador is located in a poorer region. 
Table 2
Selection equation for working or not in small/ medium firms in 2006 - First stage probit 
estimation
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERRORS
Age -0.0022* 0.0012
Man 0.0325 0.0247
School variation -0.2316*** 0.0106
Years of school -0.2488*** 0.0150
Head of family -0.0923*** 0.0213
Temporary contract 0.0870* 0.0449
Sub-occupied -0.0193 0.0713
Sub-remunerated 0.0273 0.0360
Social security contribution 0.0762* 0.0291
Working for 1 month -0.0412 0.0983
1 month to 1 year of work -0.0004 0.0291





Public administration -0.0285 0.0403
Belo Horizonte -0.1113** 0.0439
Rio de Janeiro -0.0370 0.0417
São Paulo -0.2179*** 0.0424
Porto Alegre -0.1551*** 0.0453
Recife 0.0206 0.0517
Constant -0.0215 0.0886
Bold coefficients for p-value: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table  3 brings the estimations  of the second and  third  equations  in  (13),  which 
corresponds to  the  wage  growth  equation by firm  size.  The solution  for  the system  of 
equations in (13), which includes the selection equation (Table 2), is simultaneously obtained 
by maximum likelihood estimation. Table 3 shows us how the behavior of the wage growth 
varies with the size of the firm. 
The  wage growth between  2006  and  2007  was greater amongst  men and  younger 
workers when compared to women and older individuals. It was also positively related with 
the increase in the years of school and with all the metropolitan regions located in the south of 
Brazil compared with the reference dummy, the city of Salvador. Only when compared to 
Recife, a city from the same region as Salvador, this last city exhibit greater wage growth in 
the case of large companies. The positive impact of the school variation was greater for larger 14
firms, a similar result for the selection equation. On the other hand, the magnitude of the 
salary increase was larger for small to medium firms located in the South of the country, 
probably revealing these enterprises were experiencing more dynamism when compared to 
the bigger ones that already achieved a more structured status.
The wage increase was also directly associated with the period of time working for the 
firm, but at decreasing rates, which was expected, provided that firm cannot augment the 
salary at increasing rates as the worker lasts in the company. This tendency was especially 
clear after the first year of contract, for both groups of firm sizes. For large enterprises, the 
wage growth increased at a faster rate after the first month to slow down after one year of 
contract,  indicating that the  first month was  faced as probation  for the  worker  and  after 
succeeding it, he or she would earn a wage increase. 
The  wage  growth  by economic  sector  revealed  that  the  salaries  in  the  industry 
increased less than other segments, in both size firms. For big companies this was also true for 
the financial sector, but not for the sales one. Social security contribution was inversed related 
with the labor income growth in the two groups of enterprises. This might be explained by the 
fact that it represents an indirect salary for the worker and a protection in the case he or she 
gets  fired.  Besides,  when the  firm  decides to incur  in such labor cost,  it becomes  more 
expensive to provide salary increase. Being this burden even more substantial for small to 
medium firms, as figures from the greater coefficient found for this group of firms compared 
to the large ones. 
Finally we get to analyze the key variables to test the EW theory, the proxies for labor 
effort: sub-occupied  and sub-remunerated.  The hypothesis  is t hat  large size firms  pay 
higher  wages  because  they  tend  to  remunerate  better  the  effort  in  order  to  minimize 
monitoring costs, which are greater when compared to smaller enterprises. 
The results from Table 3 show that the effort variables were statically significant and 
positively related with the wage growth, in the two groups of firms. However, the magnitude 
of the coefficients was larger for big firms than for smaller ones, an indication that workers 
who would  like  to work  more  hours than  they  actually do  (sub-occupied)  and  who are 
receiving, in average, less than others employees from the same category (sub-remunerated) 
are better rewarded in large size firms. This happens because, as predicted by the shirking 
version of the EW theory, when the firms have control on their monitoring technologies, two 
outcomes are possible: firms that face high monitoring costs will have incentive to pay more 
than the prevalent wage as a worker discipline, and also because they want to keep a high 
level of output due to increased effort. But if the monitoring costs aren’t high enough, the 15
firms do not need to pay an elevated salary because they can easily observe workers effort and 
this is a sufficient mechanism for no-shirking. Big companies will face higher monitoring 
costs than smaller  ones, provided  that  they have more employees  to supervise and also 
because they hire more skilled supervisors, whose opportunity cost of monitoring is greater 
(Oi, 1983 and Barth at al, 1987 apud Haber and Lamas, 1988). 
It is important to mention that, besides the association between labor effort and the 
wage differential by firm size, the investments in education, as well as the permanence on the 
job for longer periods, can also explain the differences in the wage variation for the two 
groups of firms. In fact this can also be seen as an implication from the predications of the 
EW theory, provided that, from one side, employers have incentive to pay more than the 
market-clearing  wage  in order to  attract  more productive and skilled  labor, expecting  to 
minimize the monitoring costs, and from the other side, the greater is the employee’s fidelity 
to the firms, the less expenses the enterprise will face with labor turnover. We already argued 
that the relatively higher monitoring costs and labor turnover that large size firms face as 
compared  to smaller ones  represent  proper  incentives  to attract  more  qualified  labor  and 
individuals who would rather not shrink because the penalty for losing their jobs would be 
long spells of unemployment and the lost of the elevated salary. In fact, the results from
Table  3 show that  the  effects  of school  variation and  greater  tenure  to the  job  were
specifically higher for largesize firm, as compared to small ones. 16
Table 3
Es timation for the wage growth between 2006 and 2007 by firm size
VARIABLES
SMALL AND MEDIUM LARGE
COEF. STAND. ERR COEF. STAND. ERR
School variation 0.2568*** 0.0133 0.2868*** 0.0062
Age -0.0174*** 0.0016 -0.0184*** 0.0008
Man -0.2582*** 0.0352 -0.2215*** 0.0167
Sub-occupied 0.3209*** 0.1054 0.3424*** 0.0497
Sub-remunerated 0.5566*** 0.0529 0.6122*** 0.0251
Social security 
contribution -0.2400*** 0.0416 -0.1284*** 0.0197
Working for 1 month 0.2829* 0.1455 0.1742** 0.0676
1 month to 1 year of work 0.2087*** 0.0423 0.2115*** 0.0203
1 to 2 years of work 0.1405*** 0.0499 0.1828*** 0.0240
Industry -0.1263** 0.0507 -0.1055*** 0.0243
Construction -0.0407 0.0805 -0.0525 0.0389
Sales 0.0439 0.0521 0.0733** 0.0253
Financial -0.0731 0.0521 -0.0557** 0.0250
Public administration 0.0538 0.0588 0.0443 0.0280
Recife -0.0431 0.0741 -0.1203** 0.0378
Belo Horizonte 0.3193*** 0.0636 0.2293*** 0.0316
Rio de Janeiro 0.3123*** 0.0596 0.1994*** 0.0304
São Paulo 0.6418*** 0.0629 0.4911*** 0.0302
Porto Alegre 0.5149*** 0.0662 0.3106*** 0.0324
Constant 1.5439*** 0.1299 0.4355*** 0.0469
Bold coefficients for p-value: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
6. Conclusions
Although there  is  a large body  of  empirical  evidences supporting the existence of 
wage differentials by firm size due to the EW theory in developed countries, this subject has 
not been widely explored in less developed countries, such as Brazil. Motivated by this gap in 
the Brazilian literature, the goal of this paper was to study if the wage differential between 
small/medium and large size firms in Brazil could be explained by the predictions of the EW 
theory, emphasizing the role of labor dispended effort and the wage premium. Using data 
from the Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) for the years of 2006 and 2007, the following 
hypothesis was tested: large size firms pay higher wages because they tend to remunerate 
better the effort in order to minimize monitoring costs, which are greater when compared to 
smaller enterprises. 
On  such  investigation  we  adopted  empirical  strategies  based  on  a  Switching 
Endogenous  Regression  Model.  On  the  first  stage,  probit estimations  characterized  the 
chances of working  or not in  a small  to medium  size  firm.  Given  the  possible  role  of 17
endogeneity involved in such decision of working or not in small/medium firms, simultaneous 
equations models were estimated in order to incorporate the mentioned choice. These models 
were used to estimate the wage growth between 2006 and 2007 for the two groups of firms 
studied: small/medium and large. 
The obtained estimates corroborated the idea that the dedication to labor effort had a 
positive impact on the wage growth and this impact was even greater for large size firms, 
when compared to small ones. At the same time, the growth of schooling and the longer 
permanence of the worker on the firm were also directly related with the increase of wage, 
being its effect even higher within large enterprises. These results were largely favorable to 
the predictions of the EW theory on its shirking version, because, as already argued, large size 
firms have incentive to pay more than prevalent wage in order to extract more labor effort and 
to capture more skilled and productive individuals. This, in turn, may reduce the elevated 
monitoring costs such firms face relatively to smaller ones. 
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